

00376

1962/09/16

16 SEP 62

TOP SECRET

DIRECTOR

4

ON:

DET-1-2 changed to DD/I

S/C 3-4, DD/P, AD/NE, DD/I

ROUTING

1	4
2	5
3	6
SEP 16 1551Z 62 CW-353C	
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	
IN 23209	

OPIN DIR CITE

EYES ONLY

FROM

1. FOLLOWING AUGUST MEETING PRINCIPALS WHEN WE FIRST REPORTED SOVIET CUBAN BUILDUP I SUGGESTED ONE STUDY ECONOMIC PROSPECTS OF CUBA ASSUMING SOVIET TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE AND GUIDANCE COULD CORRECT PRESENT MISMANAGEMENT OF INDUSTRY AND AGRICULTURE BY CASTRO ORGANIZATION. I THEN FELT AND STATED THAT SOVIETS WOULD REASON THAT PROPER MANAGEMENT COULD BUILD CUBA INTO A VIABLE ECONOMY WITH SUFFICIENT EXPORT OF AGRICULTURAL AND MANUFACTURED PRODUCT AND OTHER NATURAL RESOURCES TO COVER NEEDS FOR IMPORT AND PROVIDE SOME EXCESS FOR SOCIAL BETTERMENT. IN VIEW OF VERY EXTENSIVE PRESS COMMENT ON DETERIORATION OF CUBAN ECONOMY LEAVING IMPRESSION SITUATION CAN NEVER BE REVERSED AND POSSIBILITY OF SUCH REASONING INFLUENCING U. S. POLICY IMPORTANTLY I BELIEVE THE STUDY PROPOSED WILL BE REVEALING AND USEFUL.

2. ALSO BELIEVE WE MUST CAREFULLY STUDY THE PROSPECT OF SECRET IMPORTATION AND PLACEMENT OF SEVERAL SOVIET MRBNS WHICH COULD NOT BE DETECTED BY US IF CUBAN DEFENSES DENY OVERFLIGHT. IN REFLECTING ON MY OBSERVATIONS OF THOR INSTALLATION IN BRITAIN AND JUPITERS

TOP SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

CIA, [unclear] 85001255A,
Box 4,

DCI (The [unclear])

DCI-DCI [unclear]-Cuba

4 Sept 21 Sept 1962

ST/ SN/171

CW 353C

TOP SECRET

ROUTING

1
2
3

4
5
6

CU-35306

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

IN 23209

IN ITALY I CAN ENVISAGE A SOVIET PLAN TO PACKAGE MISSILE, CONTROL AND OPERATING EQUIPMENT IN SUCH A WAY THAT A UNIT COULD BE MADE OPERATIONAL A FEW HOURS AFTER A SITE CLEARED AND A MODEST CONCRETE PAD POURED. DO NOT WISH TO BE OVERLY ALARMING THIS MATTER BUT BELIEVE CIA AND COMMUNITY MUST KEEP GOVERNMENT INFORMED OF DANGER OF A SURPRISE AND ALSO THAT DETECTION OF PREPARATORY STEPS POSSIBLY BEYOND OUR CAPABILITY ONCE CUBAN DEFENSE SYSTEM OPERATIVE.

3. THRUST OF PRESS REPORTS REACHING ME IS THAT THERE EXISTS A CLEAR DEMARCATION BETWEEN DEFENSIVE AND OFFENSIVE PREPARATIONS AND I QUESTION IF WE CAN BE SURE OF THIS. I RECOGNIZE CUBAN POLICY DECISIONS MOST DELICATE AND BEYOND AGENCY OR MY COMPETENCE. HOWEVER BELIEVE WE MUST GIVE THOSE MAKING DECISION OUR BEST ESTIMATE OF POSSIBLE DEVELOPMENTS AND ALTERNATIVE SITUATIONS WHICH MIGHT EVOLVE AND UNEXPECTEDLY CONFRONT US.

END OF MESSAGE

TOP SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

"Declassified for Publication in
Foreign Relations of the United States"

CIA, [unclear] 8/10/285A,
Box 4,
DCI (Vic [unclear])
DCI-DCI [unclear]-Cuba
4 [unclear] 2/27/1462

24/2

IN 23209